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Natural Law in Aquinas and Grotius — An Ethics for Our Times? 
The present essay explores the significance of  natural law for the world of  today. It has the purpose of  calling 
for the recognition of  a universal ethics for modern times, indeed for all times. To perhaps many people 
living today, this purpose will seem either unrealistic or seriously in error. They will point out not only that 
different nations across the world fiercely oppose one another’s values, but also that there is often significant 
disagreement over values within a society. In this situation, how can there be any hope in the possibility of  a 
universal ethics? Furthermore, is it not a mistake to search for the answer in pre-modern thinkers like Grotius 
and Aquinas? 
These questions are not impartial questions. They provide a voice for historical as well as moral relativity, 
that is characteristic of  our times. By designating scholastic and early-modern philosophy as pre-modern, it is 
being claimed that the world as known to Grotius and Aquinas, is not the same as the world as we know it at 
the present day. This is intended to incline us to believe that the philosophy of  earlier times can only be 
studied as part of  a history of  ideas, rather than debated as philosophical truth. Yet, there is no reason to 
accept this point of  view. The world as it was known to medieval and early-modern thinkers was not less at 
war or divided over values, than our own. No less than our times, pre-modern times contained a wide range 
of  philosophical opinion on various subjects, including ethics. Nevertheless, earlier thinkers believed that 
there was a good purpose in disputing over truth with other philosophers, in which they included the ancients 
such as Aristotle and Cicero. They did so because they shared a view that ethics is concerned with the 
identity of  our ultimate end, and of  the necessary means of  securing it. Furthermore, they agreed with the 
ancients over the most general way to describe the end: happiness. 
When they read and considered the works of  the ancients, the writers of  the medieval or early-modern 
periods did not regard themselves as learning only about archaic ideas of  happiness. They recognised that 
both they and the ancients were involved in the same effort: the effort to discover and articulate truths of  the 
human condition, and to interpret our ultimate end. Similarly, when we examine the works of  so-called pre-
modern writers, it is not with the aim of  an historian reporting on antiquated doctrines, but of  a philosopher 
in constructive dialog with other thinkers. For this reason, it is both appropriate and essential to refer to 
‘natural law’ absolutely speaking, not a history of  ideas. 
This allows me to make an additional observation about pre-modern philosophy. Because all philosophers 
accepted that the end of  human life is happiness (even sceptics), the purpose of  philosophy was not to refute 
one’s opponents, but to amend their efforts in the limited ways in which they went astray, e.g. by providing an 
incorrect understanding of  human happiness. As a consequence, earlier thinkers did not regard the activity 
of  ethics as a matter of  opposing one’s own truth to other rival truths. Whereas, thinkers of  today frequently 
consider that each nation, or even every individual, has its own truth. A scholastic or late-scholastic 
philosopher would not have responded to the fact of  disagreement in this way. They would have regarded the 
cause of  disagreement as the existence, not of  many truths, but of  many kinds of  good. Some of  these they 
would dismiss as merely apparent, or false goods (i.e. evils desired due to the appearance of  good), but they 
also acknowledged the existence of  many real goods, for which each person may have a different degree of  
preference. For instance, one person may prefer to obtain knowledge and truth, whereas another may prefer 
sociable friendship. This produces the appearance that each person has their own truth about the good; yet in 
reality, they merely have different preferences concerning constituent parts of  a good life that everybody 
agrees are good. 
Accordingly, scholastic ethics divides into two parts. The first part concerns aspects of  a good life that it is 
necessary for everybody to obtain, irrespective of  their particular preferences and desires: this is the part 
Aquinas calls the ‘public good’ [bonum publicum].  It consists of  duties (a) of  the state; and (b) of  all citizens 1
within a state. I will elaborate on this below. The second part concerns the identity of  our supreme end, as 
well as the properly best way to attain it. 
 See e.g. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [hereafter ST] II-II.64.7c.1
In this essay I propose to examine the first of  these parts of  ethics, to show how the scholastics’ view is just as 
relevant to our own times. I will explain that the public good consists in something that every person values: 
the good of  peace. The decision to limit the discussion to the initial part of  ethics is not due (as might be 
suspected) to Aquinas and Grotius possessing opposing views of  our ultimate good. In fact both thinkers 
agree on the supreme end we ought to pursue: to attain knowledge of  God, and experience the beatific vision 
in the afterlife.  The decision is instead due to the scope of  natural law, which deals only with natural human 2
goods and ends, whereas the question of  our ultimate end concerns supernatural goods such as God’s blessings, 
heavenly joys and eternal rest. For this reason, natural law forms only one part of  ethics.  3
As an initial step therefore, I will explain that Aquinas and Grotius are not addressing separate subject-
matters in their works on natural law, but considering the same subject-matter (Part I). Then, I will describe 
how natural law is concerned only with our natural (i.e. temporal) ends, namely the pursuit of  virtuous goods 
in the present (Part II). Next, I will consider how peace is a universal end that everybody desires (Part III), 
and recount the virtuous goods that are required for peace (Part IV). Finally, I use these arguments to call for 
the recognition of  a universal ethics for modern times. 
I.  ’Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ Natural Law 
From the late-nineteenth century, scholars have come to know Grotius as a founding father of  international 
law.  This ‘recovery’ of  Grotius’s work had the result that scholars’ interest in it was largely historical. 4
Students of  international law sought out the ways in which Grotius had anticipated or laid foundations for 
the modern idea of  international obligations. At the same time, students of  political history examined the 
texts to expose the beliefs that marked Grotius as an early-modern thinker, rather than a medieval scholastic.  5
As a transitional thinker, allegedly proposing new proto-modern understandings of  law and obligation, he 
became a focus for political historians exploring ‘ideas in context’. This meant that legal philosophers 
researching on Grotius first of  all encountered his work as a primary example of  ‘Protestant natural law 
theory’, opposed to the Catholic natural law tradition of  Aquinas and the scholastics.  6
Yet, the idea that Grotius’s work describes a different kind of  natural law to Aquinas, is nothing short of  a 
misunderstanding. It is a misunderstanding first of  all, because the subject-matter in question is not Grotius’s 
or Aquinas’s opinion, but the subject of  that opinion: natural law itself. There are not two fields of  inquiry, 
but only one. There is not one natural law that God instituted for Catholics, and another natural law that 
God instituted for Protestants. (Conversely, historians investigating Catholic and Protestant opinions, might 
divide the field of  inquiry into separate parts.) But, secondly it is a misunderstanding because it relies on a 
misinterpretation of  Grotius’s text, as indicating a break of  one sort or another with the earlier Thomist 
tradition.  7
Those who have found a break between Grotius and earlier scholastic ethics, seem to have approached the 
text with some preconceptions. A modern editor of  Grotius, Richard Tuck, merely repeats the view of  Jean 
Barbeyrac, that Grotius ‘broke the ice’ after the long winter of  ancient and medieval ethics.  But he adduces 8
not one mote of  evidence for Grotius’s so-called radical departure from these earlier authorities. In fact, 
 See e.g. ibid, I-II.1-5; Grotius, De veritate religionis Christianae [Of  the Truth of  Christian Religion], II.9.2
 This directly opposes Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights [hereafter NLNR] (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2011), 437; see also 18, 23, 3
251, 280, 374. For Grotius’s contrary view, see De Iure Belli ac Pacis [hereafter DIBP], I.2.5(1); I.2.6.
 See e.g. H Vreeland, Hugo Grotius: The Father of  the Modern Science of  International Law (Oxford University Press 1917); repeated in e.g. 4
H Bull, Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Clarendon 1990), 2-3.
 See most of  all R Tuck, The Rights of  War and Peace (Oxford University Press 2001).5
 For an example stressing Grotius’s Protestant doctrines, see NE Simmonds, ‘Protestant Jurisprudence and Modern Doctrinal 6
Scholarship’ 60 (2001) Cambridge LJ, 271.
 Tuck (n 5) is a prominent recent example of  this; the earliest writer to insist on Grotius’s break with the past was in fact Samuel 7
Pufendorf. For another example, see Finnis, NLNR, 43-44.
 Grotius, The Rights of  War and Peace, Tuck ed, (3 vols, Liberty Fund 2005), I.x-xi. All other references will be to the latin text of  De Iure 8
Belli ac Pacis [Of  the Law of  War and Peace]: note Tuck’s edition translates (almost everywhere in the text) iure as ‘rights’, not ‘law’. 
The word can bear both senses, but Grotius’s usage remains close to that of  the Thomists. Notice also that iure is singular, so Tuck’s 
preferred title, ‘The Rights of  War and Peace’ manipulates the expectations of  the reader into anticipating a modern, rights-based 
discussion of  morality, as opposed to the virtue-based ethics of  the past.
Grotius’s text, even more than Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae, refers to classical and medieval writers in 
support of  his points, not the least, Aristotle and Saint Thomas.  9
This practice of  supporting doctrines by reference to earlier authorities, displays an intention not to produce 
innovations and ‘break’ with the past. It shows that Grotius understood himself  to be interpreting and 
deciphering a subject-matter in common with his predecessors. Yet, it might be supposed that Grotius broke 
with Thomist philosophy in another way. According to this view, Grotius’s break with the tradition of  
Aquinas consists in Grotius’s having replaced Aquinas’s conception of  natural law with an inferior notion. 
Whereas for Aquinas, the natural law is an ethical inquiry into our ultimate good, and the steps required to 
attain it, Grotius (so it is said) substitutes the idea that natural law is deduced from the sociable nature of  
human beings.  10
The exponents of  this view make a presumption. They suppose that Grotius’s purpose in writing De Iure Belli 
ac Pacis was to set out a comprehensive treatise on ethics, similar to that found in the Second Part (I-II & II-II) 
of  Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. There, Aquinas considers and discloses our supreme end,  and discusses the 11
virtuous goods we need to pursue in order to reach it, as well as the vices that lead us away from it.  12
Amongst this, he includes a treatise on law, with the aim of  explaining how the ethical truths he has been 
expounding reflect the revealed truths of  (Old and New) divine law, and how these truths are so inherent as 
potentialities to be grasped through practical reason, that even people who never possessed revealed truth 
about God’s law still experience these truths in their reasoning and actions as a natural law.  The treatise on 13
law also deals with a topic that requires discussion apart from questions about the virtues: the common good 
of  the whole community. Even if  people strive to attain moral goodness and avoid wrongful acts, they still 
require posited state laws e.g. to inform them of  the civil rights of  others and how to respect them.  14
However, the De Iure Belli ac Pacis was intended to be considerably narrower than the entire theological ethics 
of  Aquinas’s Summa. In fact, it corresponds more or less to the material covered by Aquinas’s treatise on law 
in the Prima-secundae, and (less comprehensively) the treatise on justice in the Secunda-secundae. Grotius 
clearly announces this intention by calling his book Of  the Law of  War and Peace. In this respect his work 
resembles a number of  earlier scholastic treatises entitled De Iustitia et Iure or De Legibus, from which an 
unwary or unsympathetic reader can discern an overly narrow understanding of  law (compared to Aquinas). 
Yet as with Aquinas, it cannot be presumed that an author’s doctrine of  natural law contains everything that 
author wants to say about the subject of  ethics, particularly if  (as with Grotius) he or she wrote other ethical 
treatises inquiring into the human good. The fact that a writer possesses a narrower definition of  law than 
Aquinas, does not in the least signify that they have made a substantial departure from Aquinas. They would 
merely emphasise, even more strongly than Aquinas, that our lawful obligations to act with virtue do not 
form the whole of  our duty to God.  15
Thus, for Grotius no less than for Aquinas, natural law comprises an ethical inquiry into our proper ends. Yet 
because the scope of  Grotius’s text is primarily concerned with the topic of  peace, he considers only aspects 
of  natural law that pertain to peace, and the vices that cause its absence. This can give the impression that 
Grotius’s moral theology (i.e. an investigation into our supreme end and the ways needed to attain it) is 
considerably inferior to that of  Aquinas. In fact, it shows a failure by modern commentators to appreciate the 
significance of  the title, De Iure Belli ac Pacis. 
In another attempt to discover fundamental differences of  approach between Grotius and Aquinas, modern-
day Thomists have accused Grotius of  departing from Aquinas’s careful eudaemonism, by suggesting that 
 See De Iure Belli ac Pacis [hereafter DIBP], Prolegomena §§ XLIII, XLVI & LIII.9
 See for example A Brett, Changes of  State (Princeton University Press 2011), 69-86.10
 ST I-II.1-5.11
 On virtues, one should include all of  I-II.6-70 & II-II.1-170; on vices see I-II.71-89.12
 See generally ST I-II.90-108.13
 ST I-II.90.2c & ad 3.14
 Apart from his De Veritate, one should also look to Grotius’s treatises Via ac Pacem Ecclesiasticam [The Way to Religious Peace], and his 15
two Commentaries on the Old and New Testament.
natural law is apprehended by considering the conformity or disconformity of  an act to our ‘rational 
nature’.  This appears to convert an ethical inquiry into an anthropological inquiry. 16
It should be observed that the modern-day Thomists have every motive to uncover important differences that 
make Grotius’s theory inferior to that of  Aquinas. For, they wish to reinforce the impression that Aquinas’s 
philosophy is the true philosophy, or philosophia perennis, of  the Catholic Church, and that later writers who 
rely on Aquinas for their natural law theories (such as Vasquez, Suarez and Grotius) are inferior copies, who 
corrupted Aquinas’s insights in one way or another. As a result, this ambition discouraged the modern 
commentators from reading Grotius’s texts with the same level of  care they devote to Aquinas. They 
emphasised passages which seem to confirm Grotius’s novelty, and read them out of  their context, without 
diligently searching for passages which explain or qualify the seemingly novel remarks. 
The passage mentioned above is one example. In fact, it shows that Grotius’s conception of  natural law is not 
very dissimilar from that of  Aquinas. For, after defining natural law as ‘a dictate of  right reason, indicating by 
its conformity or disconformity with rational nature the moral shamefulness or moral necessity inherent in an 
act, and consequently that it is either forbidden or commanded by God’,  he immediately states: ‘The acts 17
about which such a dictate is given, are in themselves either rightly due or wrongful, and are therefore to be 
understood as either commanded or forbidden by God…’  The italicised words draw attention to the fact 18
that it is the innate quality of  an act, in being directed toward a good end or a bad end, that determines its 
moral righteousness or wrongfulness. The moral quality of  an act makes it fitting or unfitting to a rational 
nature, but its naturalness or unnaturalness is not the cause of  its moral quality. In fact, Grotius particularly 
distinguishes between ‘primary precepts of  nature’ (such as the effort to preserve oneself) and ‘the conformity 
of  things to reason … in which the moral good [honestum] is the object’, which ‘ought to be esteemed more 
highly’ than those things that conform to the primary precepts alone.  19
Furthermore, as a Protestant natural lawyer Grotius does not possess a different understanding to Aquinas of  
our knowledge of  moral truths. Historians of  political thought have emphasised the importance of  the 
principle of  sola scriptura, i.e. the principle that our knowledge of  truth about God and ethics comes solely 
from reading the scriptures. Yet, Grotius affirms that our knowledge of  God (and moral truth) ‘is implanted 
in us, partly by reason, and partly by perpetual tradition’.  Only the latter is a reference to divinely revealed 20
law, confirmed by ‘numerous arguments and miracles.’ 
As is evident from these remarks, there is no watershed between Aquinas and Grotius due to a so-called 
breach between Catholic and Protestant natural law. In the following section, I will show that Grotius and 
Aquinas additionally agree about the substance and purpose of  natural law. 
II.  The Subject-Matter of  Natural Law 
Grotius’s Preliminary Discourse to De Iure Belli ac Pacis announces its scope and aim: to elaborate the content 
of  ‘the law that obtains among many peoples, or intercedes between the rulers of  peoples.’  The sources of  21
this law derive from (i) nature; (ii) institutions of  divine command; and (iii) customary behaviour [moribus] or 
tacit agreement. It is in view of  the third of  these sources that Grotius limits discussion to law among ‘many 
peoples’ rather than ‘all peoples’. In one way, this has the result that Grotius’s discussion is broader than the 
treatment Aquinas gives to law in the Summa Theologiae, because it considers a source of  laws (mores) that 
Aquinas refers to only in passing. But in another way it is narrower, because the inclusion of  mores pertains to 
matters about which there can be reasonable disagreement, where lawful obligations are concretised through 
 This is essentially Finnis’s objection (see the reference in n 7).16
 DIBP I.10.1. The Tuck edition renders ius naturale in this context as ‘natural right’ (presumably to strengthen the case from Grotius’s 17
innovation).
 Ibid, I.10.2 (my emphasis). The Tuck edition (which incorporates an older translation of  the French edition of  the original Latin 18
text) renders debiti and illiciti as ‘lawful’ and ‘unlawful’, which helps to obscure the point that the rightfulness or wrongfulness of  
actions is not caused by a divine command, but rather the cause of such a command. See also the Prolegomena (preliminary discourse) § 
XI (the famous etiamsi daremus passage).
 Ibid, I.2.1(2); De Veritate I.23 & III.12.19
 DIBP, Prolegomena § XI.20
 Ibid, § I.21
specification.  Such created laws are, as Grotius implies, not universally detectable by reason, and so obtain 22
only among peoples who introduce them through a kind of  agreement. 
Readers of  Aquinas have sometimes had reason to complain that his treatment of  natural law does not give 
very specific guidance on practical questions of  justice and obligation. To mention only one recent example, 
John Finnis laments that ‘Aquinas’s account of  [moral reasoning] is, at best, highly elliptical, scattered, and 
difficult to grasp, and at worst, seriously underdeveloped.’  An instance of  this can be seen in Aquinas’s 23
discussion of  tyrannical laws. He holds that the proclamations of  a tyrant do not possess the true 
characteristics of  proper law, and are not binding in conscience; yet he says that even tyrannical laws share 
the property of  seeking to make citizens conform to goodness, though in a perverted way, and thereby 
achieve a kind of  order for the community.  Consequently, it may be necessary for a person to abide by 24
immoral laws in order to avoid creating civil disturbance.  Yet, this does not tell us very much about the 25
conditions in which a person can legitimately resist an unjust law, versus circumstances where they ought to 
obey the law even in the face of  injustice. Reasonably, it could be supposed that Aquinas wants to distinguish 
situations where I should give up my just rights, to preserve public peace, versus situations where I am legally 
obligated to commit an immoral act (e.g. depriving another of  their rights). But this assumption does not offer 
very concrete guidance to a person who (say) is faced with sacrificing property rights that will become their 
children’s inheritance, against immediate considerations of  public order. 
By contrast, Grotius’s discussion is aimed at specifying a particular content for the law amongst peoples. This 
enables him to give more specificity to the lawful demands upon peoples and lawful rulers. For, his immediate 
aim is not theological (identifying the inmost demands that apply to all consciences) but political (explaining 
how such demands apply within nations and between nations). In this, Grotius follows earlier scholastic 
commentators like Molina, Vasquez and Suarez, who expanded Aquinas’s relatively brief  treatment of  law 
(I-II.90-108) into treatises on law and justice spanning multiple books or volumes. By comparing the length 
of  Aquinas’s and Grotius’s discussions, we can see how Grotius is concerned to give much more detailed 
guidance regarding our natural obligations of  peace and justice. 
Aside from this difference, Aquinas and Grotius share a similar view of  the scope and purpose of  natural law. 
It is concerned with the virtuous duties of  justice, temperance, fortitude etc that natural reason informs us are 
required for a good life in the temporal world, as distinct from our supernatural duties toward God, which 
are only discoverable to us through divine revelation and Grace. This does not mean, as some commentators 
have asserted, that natural law is entirely secular. Our natural reason is sufficient to inform us of  the existence 
of  a Creator of  ourselves and of  the world, as Aquinas and Grotius both attest, just as the fact of  our own 
existence allows us to believe that our Creator is a loving God. In Aquinas’s words, this gives us an inclination 
to know the truth concerning God;  but reason alone is insufficient (without the aid of  Grace and revelation) 26
properly to understand and discover the truth. For example, in the New Testament, Jesus reveals that the 
Scribes and Pharisees have an utterly wrong view of  God, even though they know and believe in Him. 
Through revealed teachings (e.g. the Sermon on the Mount) and examples drawn from Jesus’s life, we gain 
the correct understanding that the way to God lies in the workings of  charity, alongside the other theological 
virtues of  faith and hope: the so-called ‘infused’ virtues which depend on divine Grace. 
Natural law refers to the part of  ethics that is discoverable to human reason alone. The ancient writers 
provide a good example of  philosophers who arrived at truths about ethics without the assistance of  divine 
revelation. Moreover, Aristotle and Plato (to name only two) both affirm that God exists, and that human 
beings should tend toward Him, even though they do not possess correct knowledge of  the Holy Trinity. This 
permits later scholastic philosophers to draw upon ancient works as a genuine source of  insight into ethical 
truths. They share the belief  that our final natural end consists in happiness: in ancient Greek thought, 
eudaemonia, or in Aquinas’s terminology, felicitas (or as he often expresses it, beatitudo imperfecta, as opposed to the 
perfect beatitude experienced by the saints in heaven). 
 See e.g. ST I-II.95.2c & ad 3; DIBP I.1.10.22
 Finnis, NLNR, 46; see also 34.23
 See ST I-II.92.4 ad 3; I-II.96.4c.24
 Ibid, I-II.96.4 ad 3, also I-II.97.1 ad 2; II-II.117.6c.25
 See I-II.94.2c; on the existence of  God, see I.12.1c; on God’s love see I.20.2c & ad 1.26
Yet, they were aware that it is possible for human beings to be gravely mistaken about the character of  the 
ultimate end. Although everybody agrees that it consists in happiness, they disagree about what happiness is. 
For example, Aristotle remarks that the uneducated think happiness consists of  pleasure, or riches, whereas 
others believe that it is found in honour or fame.  The ancient and medieval philosophers reject these images 27
of  happiness as deficient, instead defining genuine happiness as a life centred around the practice of  the 
virtues. The possibility to act against one’s true good explains how a part of  ethics consists in a natural law. 
We are naturally subject to a law in one sense, because the reason for undertaking any action is to obtain 
some end, that is considered as good;  and we are subject to a law in another sense, because we ought to act 28
for the sake of  ends that are truly good rather than ends that are merely apparently good (such as sensation 
or pleasure). 
Modern writers tend to regard as antiquated the idea that there are human goods that are objectively good 
irrespective of  personal opinions. Utilitarian thinkers offer one example of  the belief  that all goods are 
merely apparent goods. In the following sections, I hope to show that this belief  is mistaken. But first, my 
present concern is to show that Aquinas and Grotius substantially agree on the character and purpose of  
natural law, and how it causes us to seek a good life. They would have concurred in believing that every 
person is enabled to distinguish properly good ends from actually wicked ones, at least to some degree. For, 
the natural law is an ‘imprint’ on a rational nature of  eternal law, i.e. God’s plan for the world and all things, 
from which we ‘derive our inclinations to our proper acts and ends.’  This brings together the two senses in 29
which we are subject to a natural law, mentioned in the preceding paragraph: as a ‘participation of  eternal 
law in the rational creature’, we have imprinted upon us inclinations to proper acts and ends; and, by acting 
in conformity to rational nature, we act for the sake of  what is properly good rather than a mere simulacrum 
of  goodness. As I commented earlier, Grotius shares this belief  that rightful acts are in accord with our 
rational nature. 
Both Grotius and Aquinas mention in particular one inclination, the inclination to live at peace in society, as 
being peculiar to rational nature, as opposed to inclinations that we have in common with other animals, such 
as the desire for self-preservation, or to beget and raise offspring. As Grotius emphasises, this inclination is not 
of  living in society ‘in any way whatever’, but specifically ‘peacefully, and ordered according to human 
intelligence.’  Or as Aquinas puts it: to avoid causing offence to those with whom one ought to live 30
harmoniously [debet conversari].  That is to say: social peace is not to be considered as only a necessary means 31
to pursuit of  one’s private ends. It is a positive obligation of  every person to seek peace with all others, and to 
practise the virtues that contribute to peace: above all justice, but also other moral virtues as we shall shortly 
see. 
Modern scholarship on Aquinas and Grotius pays little or no attention to the importance of  virtue.  Yet, its 32
centrality is clearly seen if  we only consider that the whole of  Aquinas’s moral theology in the Summa (i.e. the 
entire Secunda pars) is devoted to identifying the virtuous dispositions and choices which lead us toward our 
supreme end, and the vices and sins that lead away from it. Interpreters who assume that Aquinas’s whole 
account of  ethics is contained in his doctrine of  natural law, do not have a strong incentive to explore 
questions of  the virtues, as this will seem to relate to the interior act of  conscience with which a person 
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.5.1095b-1096a. Tuck regards Grotius as having made a decisive break with Aristotle, despite what 27
Grotius says at DIBP Proleg § XLIII (i.e. that Aristotle holds the most exalted place among philosophers), by rejecting the doctrine of  
the mean. This overlooks the places where Grotius employs the doctrine, e.g. I.2.1(3), where he carefully explores the types of  action 
which do and do not involve a mean. Nor was this new: see Aquinas, De Virtutibus I.13.
 See ST I-II.94.2c; I-II.91.2 ad 2; Suppl. 98.1c & ad 2 (evil does not move the will except insofar as it is thought to be good); see also 28
Sent IV.49.1.3.
 Ibid. I-II.91.2c; also I-II.94.6c & ad 1 (the most basic precepts of  natural law cannot be expunged by sin). Grotius also mentions the 29
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performs their duty. Because their attention is trained most of  all on the external act, this causes modern 
scholars to look for the end or good of  action in some extrinsic object which the act brings about. It 
diminishes the idea of  true human ends or goods as consisting in virtuous goodness.  
The instinct of  peaceful sociability provides one clear example. Modern Thomists such as Finnis create the 
impression that the good of  sociability is a pre-moral good, which may figure in one’s choices to a greater or 
lesser extent.  Perhaps this was done with the conscious aim of  overturning an image of  Aquinas as a 33
paternalist insisting on the goodness of  only one way of  life: there are many good ways of  living that conform 
to natural law. So far, the modern view is correct. Aquinas is not a paternalist for whom there is only one 
good way of  life. However, he would not have regarded morality as merely a question of  how reasonably one 
selects and pursues pre-moral ends. The profusion of  good ways of  living is the result of  many paths by 
which our circumstances can lead us to virtue. For example: an outgoing and gregarious person will find 
many opportunities to express their sociable nature through acts of  love and kindness; whereas, a shy and 
reserved person is not absolved of  the duty of  neighbourly love, but can find other ways of  expressing it, for 
instance in print by joining a scholarly debate, or by giving alms to good causes. A person who fails to 
demonstrate neighbourly concern for any other person, is not simply missing out on a (pre-moral) human 
good — as Finnis’s discussion seems to imply — but exhibits the vice of  immisericordia, that is, they are lacking 
the virtue of  compassion. As this shows, sociability is a virtuous good not a pre-moral good. 
It is likely that the same legalist view of  Grotius’s ethics is responsible for his modern commentators’ 
tendency to sideline the importance of  the virtues. But there is also an additional reason why the modern 
commentators do not wish to emphasise the virtues in Grotius’s ethics. For, this would not fit with the view 
that Grotius ‘broke the ice’ after the long winter of  ancient and medieval ethics. Yet, if  we look at how 
Grotius introduces the subject of  natural law, the place of  the virtues is evident. He mentions two respects in 
which human understanding forms the origin of  law [iuris] within us: the first is our grasp of  how to live 
peacefully in society, and of  the means by which each person must care for the peace of  society (i.e. the virtue 
of  justice — see Part IV below); the second is our ability to discern the consequences of  actions, and to form 
judgments in light of  them. Grotius immediately makes clear that this is a reference to the virtues.  He does 34
this by naming some of  the ways in which our judgment (of  whether something accords or is disagreeable to 
our nature) can become corrupted: by impure delight in immediate pleasure; by fear, or by excessiveness or 
violence in one’s passions. Each of  these deficiencies is a vice which demands correction by the practice of  
the corresponding virtue. 
In order not to multiply examples, I will mention only one further instance where the centrality of  the virtues 
to Grotius’s text is made clear. This is near the beginning of  Book I, when he states that the inquiry concerns 
the question, when wars can be just, and what can be done in war without committing injustice.  Here, 35
Grotius informs his reader that ‘war’ is to be taken in its widest sense: it extends to every kind of  dispute 
between two individuals, as well as between groups and nations, which disrupts the peace between them.  36
Justice (and every other virtue connected to peace)  is the virtuous good by which people are restored to 37
peace, or through which peaceful relations between persons are preserved. Again, today’s readers will miss 
the significance of  Grotius’s concern with justice, if  they come to the text expecting to find only the 
beginnings of  a modern idea of  international law (i.e. justice between nations). 
One should not be misled by the focus taken by Grotius in the De Iure Belli, or by Aquinas in the ‘treatise’ on 
laws in the Summa. It would be easy to assume that both figures regarded our natural, temporal happiness as 
consisting in a life of  justice and peace. This ignores the Christian dimension of  their work, which 
emphasises contemplation and worship of  God, through good acts and prayer. However, neither writer 
regarded the purpose of  the temporal community as coercing people to pursue their supreme end. The 
power of  temporal communities is limited to enforcing peaceful actions that are necessary for the safety and 
internal tranquility of  the community. 
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Even these very brief  remarks indicate that Grotius and Aquinas were not propounding radically divergent 
ideas of  natural law. In fact, Grotius offers a good example of  an ethicist whose natural law doctrine is close 
to that of  Aquinas. But, this similarity does not prove that there are any universal human ends, or to use the 
expression preferred today, human goods. Many people living today believe that it has become impossible to 
point to any universal human goods, because all people disagree about what is good, or even right. I will now 
attempt to show that this significantly exaggerates the disagreements that people have: our disagreements 
about what is good do not extend to everything, as modern-day writers seem to suggest. 
III.  A Universal End For All: Peace 
It was apparent to the thinkers of  earlier times, that everybody desires peace. And even further: everybody 
realises and wishes that members of  the community must seek peace together, both within their community 
and with other nations.  
The best way to demonstrate this truth is by considering the situation in which a community lacks peace. If  
there is no peace within a community, the possibility to pursue any other human good disintegrates. Indeed, 
the basic existence of  every person is threatened. Thus, all can agree on the goodness of  peace, even if  they 
disagree about the ultimate end. This does not rule out — as is evident from world politics — that different 
persons or nations may disagree concerning the most appropriate way to peace. For instance, even those who 
wage aggressive wars do so with the aim of  instituting a peace, though on unjust terms. Yet tyrants, as well as 
foreign conquerors, cannot impose peace without gaining the cooperation of  members of  the community 
(including by fear) in upholding peace. For there will not be peace unless every person contributes their effort, 
by observing their legal duties, and refraining from criminal acts. 
This reveals that the end of  peace is a universal end: even the very wicked desire peace on their own terms, in 
order not to have to contest with enemies over the things they desire to have. For, a wickedly immoral person 
will at least desire that others do not obstruct their activities, and at worst to dominate others so that they will 
carry out the will of  their oppressor, without resistance. Exactly because peace is necessary for every end, it is 
objectively valuable for every person without exception, no matter what their conception of  their ultimate 
end. By calling peace ‘objectively valuable’, I mean that it is of  vital importance for every person even if  they 
fail to perceive its importance. A wicked person still values peace, even if  they do not recognise that it forms 
part of  the situation they aim to bring about. 
For the same reason, peace is not a culturally or politically relative goal. Every ideology has the purpose of  
instituting a particular way of  living, and of  becoming accepted by a community. Thus even the most 
intolerant ideology strives to create stable and peaceful conditions, in line with its values. Furthermore, this 
aim remains unchanged even if  a regime is imposed upon a people against its will. Likewise, the very 
conception of  a ‘people’ or ‘community’ implies the existence of  peaceful internal conditions. Otherwise, as 
Grotius says, a contending and unruly population has not yet even united into a nation.  38
Aside from properly wicked individuals, everyone realises that it is necessary to contribute to social peace, at 
least in the most minimal sense by refraining from breaking the law. They understand that peace is not a 
good that any person can achieve for the community on their own: it requires the common will and effort of  
the people as a whole. This is one reason why Grotius, in the remark just quoted, talks of  a people being 
united into a nation. 
However, most people wish for more than a collective decision not to break the law. Although, as Grotius 
says,  it is not possible to be friends with everybody, the majority of  people realise that a good life consists of  39
very close relations with a few others (e.g. one’s family or partner), and amicable relations with others. This 
includes e.g. the willingness to enter into agreements with others, even for one’s own enrichment, but also 
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more complicated political arrangements to produce common goods for the entire community (such as 
schools and hospitals), as I will explain below. 
IV.  A Necessary Foundation for Peace: Justice 
This explanation allows us to see that at least some of  our duties of  peace consist in duties of  justice. Aquinas 
for example, comments that works of  justice are directed to the observance of  peace between persons, by the 
fact that each person is undisturbed [quiete] in their possessions.  He explains that, in respecting the right of  40
another person, we indirectly contribute to the common good.  Whereas, by ensuring that all our actions 41
conform to justice, we make a direct contribution to the common good.  The common good that is served 42
by our acts of  justice toward others, is the good of  peace. This can be seen in the specific acts of  justice that 
Aquinas expressly discusses, including: honouring one’s debts, refraining from harms against another’s person 
and property, not defaming or bearing false witness, and avoiding acts of  disloyalty to one’s community.  In 43
fact the very definition of  justice, according to the scholastic writers, is (in Grotius’s words) ‘refraining from 
that which pertains to another’,  or in other words, leaving them in peace. The connection of  justice with 44
peace is also discernible in the classical expression, ‘rendering to others their proper right.’  For, as Grotius 45
observes, this is really the demand that one either (a) leave another undisturbed in the enjoyment of  what is 
theirs, or (b) restore to another anything of  theirs that we possess, including any profit derived from it. 
Furthermore, it is a demand (c) to fulfil one’s promises that are owed to another, and (d) to compensate 
another for harms brought about due to one’s fault.  46
Each of  these acts helps to maintain social peace. By restoring justice between the parties, sources of  
contention are extinguished and a peaceful order between persons is re-established. On the contrary, the 
commission of  an unjust act, is an act contrary to social peace. Accordingly, the infliction of  penalties (by the 
state) upon wrongdoers is necessary to restore the balance of  justice in society.  Therefore, Grotius warns 47
that resisting the lawful punishment of  the state (e.g. by absconding or denying one’s criminal act) offends 
against the internal tranquility and quiet condition of  the state.  48
It is often overlooked that, in addition to upholding peace between persons, just acts are acts by which each 
citizen assists the state government to protect the good and suppress evils.  For instance, by paying taxes a 49
citizen enables the state government to employ a police force, or possess a standing army to protect against 
invaders. But this is not the only example. Grotius mentions the contribution to social peace of  those who 
resolve their differences via state courts or tribunals, rather than resorting to ‘private war.’  Furthermore, 50
each person’s duties to instil peace include forgiving minor faults and refraining from demanding satisfaction 
of  one’s right in relation to trivial causes.  By limiting lawsuits to very serious matters, citizens prevent the 51
state from being overwhelmed by an impossible number of  complaints. In this respect therefore, the duty to 
act with justice for the sake of  the common good, also includes the need to practise the virtue of  fortitude 
[fortitudo]. 
In fact, it was accepted by the scholastics and ancient philosophers that so-called ‘general’ justice (i.e. the duty 
each citizen owes to the common good, as opposed to particular individuals) incorporated acts of  all the 
virtues. This can be seen e.g. in the demand not to lend at usury,  or to demand excessive compensation (i.e. 52
the virtue of  moderation [temperantia]), and in the forgiveness of  wrongs or waiving of  debts against the poor, 
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as in the virtue of  mercy [misericordia],  not to mention the need to orientate one’s practical deliberations to 53
good ends rather than evil ends (the virtue of  prudentia).  54
More generally, Grotius and Aquinas both understand the duty of  justice to encompass not only abstention 
from violence against others, but also a prohibition on war by a people against their lawful ruler.  Indeed for 55
Aquinas (as for Grotius) the agreeability of  one’s behaviour with these precepts of  justice depends upon a 
positive force: sociability, or love of  others. Aquinas’s word diligere,  distinguishes this ‘sociable regard’ found 56
in all peoples from the more demanding benevolent love of  one’s neighbours [caritas] preached by the 
Scriptures as a duty for all Christians. This explains that peace is possible for all nations, not only for 
Christian peoples. 
The positive love of  others, above mere toleration of  their existence, underlines an important point: almost 
all of  the goods that arise out of  social peace come from interaction between citizens rather than the state. 
For the avoidance of  any doubt, ‘love’ as used here extends to the willingness to trust others sufficiently to 
enter into economic relationships with them, such as contracts of  employment. For most societies, important 
goods like health and education (even where they are state-funded) arise from voluntary transactions, rather 
than e.g. a state law compelling talented individuals to become doctors or teachers. 
By studying the above examples of  just acts, we can see that acts that disrupt social peace are not confined to 
prohibited acts under the state criminal law, such as theft or murder. Additionally, failing to keep one’s duty to 
another damages social peace, or to put it more positively, observing one’s civil duties makes a contribution to 
social peace. This signifies the area known to ancient and early-modern philosophers as commutative justice. It 
would include e.g. fulfilling one’s contractual promises, giving compensation for harm, and returning that 
which belongs to another, as in stolen property. As an example where restitution prevents civic disturbance, a 
person can publicly apologise to another for dishonouring them (i.e. restore their good name), rather than 
inflaming the situation by continuing with the allegation.  57
The above duties are all duties of  citizens within a state. By observing them, each person makes an important 
contribution to social peace. In other words they form one way in which members of  the community seek 
after peace together. But if  a community is to achieve peace within its borders, it is also necessary for the state 
government to enact laws for the sake of  peace.  
First and foremost, the state has to enact laws that establish public safety, by prohibiting and punishing 
murder, violent attack, rape and so forth. Then, it has to outlaw serious forms of  dishonesty, such as theft, 
fraud, extortion, etc. Finally, the state has to create laws that compel every member of  the community to fulfil 
their obligations e.g. by respecting one another’s rights, performing contractual bargains, compensating for 
harms, and so on. By doing this, the state ensures the internal tranquility of  the community. 
At the same time, it is important for the state to maintain a distinction between criminal acts, which invite 
punishment, and civil wrongs and harms which attract only a civil remedy. Think of  the difference between 
someone who breaches a contractual agreement in order to secure a better bargain with another, and 
someone who commits fraud: in the first case, the person seeks an economic advantage by causing harm to a 
specific person (possibly a legal person), an economic advantage that is diminished by having to perform a 
restitutio, i.e. an act cancelling out the harm done to the other. The harm done to society is vastly more 
remote, as the existence of  a civil remedy is sufficient to deter the majority of  citizens from dishonestly 
breaking agreements. In the case of  fraud, the harm to society itself  is much greater and more immediate, for 
the commission of  fraud is an attempt to deceive every person: for example, by artificially raising prices, or by 
ensuring that the transactions people enter into are not the ones they believe they are entering into. A 
criminal penalty (such as a fine) is appropriate because the injury is to society as a whole.  As a contrast, the 58
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historical use of  debtors’ prisons illustrates the injustice of  using a punishment designed to protect the public 
(imprisonment), as a civil remedy to redress a private harm (defaulting on one’s debts).  59
Civic harmony [tranquillitas] is one component of  social peace within the state. In addition, two other 
elements of  peace have to be ensured. First, the state government must defend the community from external 
enemies (e.g. by seeking peace with other states, or by maintaining an army). Second, the state must ensure at 
least a minimum level of  prosperity for every citizen, so as to avoid a situation where people are obliged to 
fight one another over basic resources. Both conditions give rise to duties of  justice that on first glance do not 
seem to be essential for peace, or in other words, both conditions give rise to duties indirectly related to peace. 
As an example, the payment of  taxes or rates assists the state to create an army, or to provide subsidies for the 
most poor. Both Aquinas and Grotius would regard duties of  this kind as arising from positive state law, 
rather than natural law.  For, they represent a determination of  natural law according to the circumstances 60
of  particular times and places. This has the result that a modern scholar who searches for a writer’s views on 
justice, will gain only a partial and thus distorted image if  he or she confines their attention to what that 
writer says about natural law. In addition, a scholar must also look to a writer’s discussion of  the law of  
peoples [ius gentium], as well as the positive law enacted by the state [ius civile].  61
For present purposes however, it is only necessary to note that, by seeking together the common human good 
of  peace, persons within a community are required to practise the virtues, i.e. the virtue of  justice along with 
all of  the virtues connected to justice. I will now briefly turn to discuss what this means. 
V.  A Universal Ethics for Modern Times 
The foregoing arguments establish the existence of  at least one universal human good: the good of  peace. 
Then, they demonstrate the existence of  further common goods, namely virtuous goods required in order to 
uphold social peace. Among these virtuous goods, justice is the most important and pre-eminent. Even those 
who act unjustly toward others, value the virtue of  justice. For, even the most wicked person wants to be 
treated with justice, in the sense that they do not wish to receive less than is due to them, or to be punished 
more severely than is due. 
I propose that we can speak of  the virtuous duties of  all persons in society, as outlined above in Part IV, as a 
core morality. As explained in the preceding paragraph, the core morality is a universal morality: it holds good 
for all times and places, and applies to all persons without exception.  
In a similar way, there is also a core morality that binds state governments. For state governments also possess 
duties of  justice toward their citizens, as outlined above. To be more precise, the individual persons who hold 
positions within the government and bureaucracy possess: (i) duties of  justice for the sake of  the common 
good, as ordinary persons (i.e. the core morality); and (ii) duties of  justice to exercise their power and office 
diligently and only for the sake of  the common goods of  peace, justice, safety and prosperity. 
It should not be forgotten that the core morality binding upon each person, is only a minimal morality. It 
represents the least amount of  virtue that each person is required to exhibit. Yet, it was very apparent to 
Aquinas and to Grotius that every person ought to strive after virtuous goods in excess of  the minimum 
required for peace. For example, Christians are required to practise the virtues of  charity, liberality and 
beneficence (to name only a few). It is because these virtues seek after a higher end than social peace (namely, 
our return to God in the afterlife), that they fall outside the core morality, and also the scope of  the present 
discussion. Grotius and Aquinas would not have considered that such virtuous goods are any less universal 
than the virtues of  justice and peace (sociability); but their discussion like the present one, attempted to treat 
them initially separately from their treatment of  natural law in the strict sense. 
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Nevertheless, the present essay has had the limited purpose of  clarifying the idea of  natural law, and 
demonstrating its relevance for the modern age. By doing so, it calls for the recognition of  a universal ethics 
for modern times — in fact, for all times. The conclusion of  this essay is therefore the starting-point, rather 
than the end, of  ethics.
